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To explain an October 16, 2018 US Securities and Exchange Commission order that unanimously upheld a SIFMA challenge to fee increases for “depth-of-book” market data filed by Nasdaq and NYSE Arca and the SEC’s simultaneous remanding of over 400 market data fee and other filings back to the exchanges for consideration under the standards set out in the order.

Explains the criteria for fee increases under the Exchange Act, the SEC’s historic routine approval of exchanges’ proposed fee increases, the SEC’s challenge to two recent market data filings, and the SEC’s remanding of 400 additional market data fee filings challenged by SIFMA to the exchanges and the National Market System (NMS) for reconsideration. Analyzes and discusses the SEC’s order.

The SECs’ SIFMA order appears to raise the bar significantly for what exchanges must show to justify fee increases.More broadly, all five SEC Commissioners (of both parties) appear to be rethinking the role of for-profit exchanges in the regulatory structure.These orders have the potential to rewrite the regulation of market data, other exchange fees, and potentially the relationship between the exchanges and other market participants, for the entire securities industry.

Practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

On September 3, 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced what quickly became the gravest scandal in the mutual fund industry in the 65 years since Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940. Spitzer’s office discovered that some hedge funds had been permitted to trade shares of open‐end mutual funds after that day’s net asset value (NAV) for those mutual funds had been set (typically at 4:00 PM eastern time). This practice allowed the hedge funds to profit based on corporate news announcements released after that time, and therefore not reflected in the mutual funds’ daily NAV. Moreover, Spitzer disclosed that some mutual fund advisers had only selectively enforced the stated limits in their prospectuses on frequent trading, or market timing, of those mutual funds. In some cases, mutual fund advisers had permitted selected investors to conduct frequent trading in mutual funds in return for investments (sometimes referred to as “sticky assets”) in other investment vehicles, or had permitted frequent trading by officers of the adviser itself. And some mutual fund advisers had selectively disclosed information about portfolio holdings of the funds to hedge funds that used that information to arbitrage the mutual funds’ positions. This was the second major securities industry scandal uncovered by Spitzer’s office in just two years. In 2002, Spitzer’s office uncovered the research analyst independence scandal that culminated in a global settlement with the country’s major investment banks. Spitzer’s 15‐person Securities Bureau appeared more nimble and better informed than the thousands of staff members at the Securities and Exchange Commission, the federal agency charged with regulating the mutual fund industry. The SEC ‐ already under fire for the unprecedented wave of corporate and brokerage industry scandals that led to adoption of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act ‐ had to endure yet another round of vocal public criticism.

This paper sets out to explain the new Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 15c3‐5, which will require broker‐dealers to adopt and implement risk controls to govern their provision of “direct market access” (DMA).

The paper explains how the development and use of automated electronic trading processes and systems motivated broker‐dealers to offer DMA, “sponsored access,” and “naked access.” It explains the systems of risk management controls and supervisory procedures a broker‐dealer is required to maintain to manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks of sponsored access, including financial and regulatory controls and procedures.

The SEC proposed the Rule to more effectively manage the financial, regulatory, and other risks, such as legal and operational risks, associated with market access.

The paper offers practical guidance from expert broker‐dealer lawyers.

The aim is to explain certain disclosure and other obligations of municipal securities dealers when they act as underwriters to municipal securities issuers, as contained in a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board interpretive notice regarding MSRB Rule G‐17, approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2012.

The paper explains the basic fair dealing principle; required disclosure by an underwriter; timing, manner, acknowledgement, and substance of disclosures; guidance concerning the role and compensation of the underwriter; disclosures of other conflicts; disclosures required in the case of complex financing structures; guidance concerning underwriter compensation and new issuance pricing; requirements for underwriters to honor retail order periods; and guidance on dealer payments to issuer personnel.

Although most underwriters have always viewed themselves as having a duty of fair dealing to municipal issuers, the MSRB's notice will require underwriters to formalize their procedures. Underwriters will have to develop mandatory disclosures, checklists of potential conflict disclosures, and procedures for receiving written acknowledgments. They will need to rethink how they approach complex financings.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

In a high‐profile case that first drew big media headlines last February, a New York brokerage firm and a ring of eight brokers on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange were charged with perpetrating a scheme in which they made over $11.1m in illegal profits and at the same time covered their tracks with an elaborate fraud.

This paper aims to addresses an important gap in anthropomorphism research by examining the individual-level factors that correlate with anthropomorphic tendency.

The extant psychology, marketing and consumer psychology literature is reviewed, and eight hypotheses devised. Data from 509 online survey respondents are analysed to identify individual characteristics associated with anthropomorphic tendency.

The results reveal that anthropomorphic tendency varies by individual and is significantly related to personality, age, relationship status, personal connection to animals and experiential thinking.

This paper extends on recent research into the individual nature of anthropomorphic tendency, once thought to be a universal trait. Given that this paper is the first of its kind, testing of further traits is merited. It is suggested that future research further examine personality, as well as other elements of individual difference, and test the role of anthropomorphic tendency in the development of processing abilities with age.

Findings show that anthropomorphic tendency may prove to be a key variable in the segmentation of markets and the design of marketing communications, and that younger, single, more creative, conscientious consumers are an appropriate target for anthropomorphic messages. The importance of personal connection to animals, as well as experiential thinking, is also highlighted.

Given the importance of anthropomorphic tendency for the processing of messages involving non-human endorsers, as well as the formation of relevant attitudes and behaviours, this paper fulfils an identified need to further understand the characteristics of those high on this tendency.